Post-quantum cryptography is no longer a research question. Federal mandates, standards bodies, and procurement frameworks have converged on a single conclusion: organizations that depend on public-key cryptography must begin migration now, or accept unquantified risk to every system that stores, transmits, or signs sensitive data.
The path from mandate to operating control follows three steps: Inventory every cryptographic dependency across the enterprise, Validate each dependency against current and emerging threat models, and Migrate to quantum-resistant alternatives on a risk-prioritized schedule.
This is a continuous control loop, not a one-time project. Cryptographic posture must be measured, reported, and improved continuously as algorithms are deprecated, new threat intelligence emerges, and compliance frameworks tighten.
Federal Timeline
2022OMB M-23-02 mandates cryptographic inventory for all federal agencies
Aug 2024NIST publishes FIPS 203, 204, 205 — first post-quantum standards finalized
Jan 2027CNSA 2.0 Phase 1 deadline — software and firmware signatures must use ML-DSA
2030CNSA 2.0 Phase 2 — networking and key establishment must use ML-KEM
2033CNSA 2.0 Phase 3 — legacy algorithm exclusion complete for National Security Systems
Risk Quadrant: Exposure x Shelf Life
The quantum risk to any given system is a function of two variables: how exposed its cryptographic surface is today, and how long the data it protects must remain confidential. Systems with high exposure and long shelf life — classified records, financial instruments, healthcare data — face the most urgent migration pressure.
Low Exposure
Short Shelf Life
Monitor
High Exposure
Short Shelf Life
Plan
Low Exposure
Long Shelf Life
Prioritize
High Exposure
Long Shelf Life
Migrate Now
Mosca's Theorem: X + Y > Z
Michele Mosca's inequality frames the urgency precisely. If X (the time a secret must remain secure) plus Y (the time required to migrate the system) exceeds Z (the time until a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer exists), then the data is already at risk. Harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks make this inequality actionable today, not at some future date when quantum hardware matures.