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QStrike methodology

Execute the governed attack path. Publish the boundary. Invite falsification.

QStrike methodology: a governed side-channel and ephemeral leak expose nonces, carried through a Hidden Number Problem path and lattice reduction.

Truth boundary: provider names describe quantum-cloud execution paths and published calibration context. They are not evidence of live provider execution, customer runtime, hardware access, or endorsement.

01

Bound the hypothesis

Start with a QScout finding, the affected cryptographic surface, the data-retention window, and a falsifiable attack-path question. QStrike does not expand scope without operator approval.

02

Bind the side-channel evidence

Observed algorithms, configurations, dependencies, side-channel evidence, and the ephemeral nonce-information leak remain bound to their approved sources and scope.

03

Run the governed quantum-cloud path

Approved workloads use real commercial quantum-cloud services across four modalities and can use up to 8 access services. QStrike carries the ephemeral leak through a Hidden Number Problem formulation and lattice reduction; it does not directly break encryption.

04

Attack the conclusion

Adversarial review checks alternative explanations, confidence, reproducibility boundaries, and the exact condition that would demote or falsify the evidence-bound conclusion.

05

Deliver a governed decision object

The output ties scope, observed evidence, attack-path inputs, result, confidence, falsification path, remediation owner, and QSolve handoff to one reviewable record.

Minimum evidence record

Observed
Approved-scope asset, algorithm, configuration, dependency, and source.
Execution
Commercial service, modality, attack-path input, evidence, and runtime version.
Result
Conclusion, confidence, alternative explanations, and falsification condition.
Action
Remediation owner, dependency, sequence, exit gate, and residual risk.

What the method never upgrades into fact

  • A resource estimate for a future machine is not a demonstrated cryptographic break.
  • A named commercial service is not proof of customer execution or provider endorsement.
  • A commercial quantum-cloud runtime is not customer evidence or proof that a client key was broken.
  • The 2029 planning horizon is not a Q-Day prediction.