Skip to content
Evidence bundle preview

What a QStrike engagement actually delivers.

Enterprise buyers validate vendors by the artifact, not the promise. This page renders the structure of a representative QStrike engagement report so procurement, security, and audit teams can evaluate the deliverable before the engagement starts.

Canonical buyer sample is the QScout evidence package at /qscout/sample-report. This route remains the QStrike engagement sample.

Contact UsSee the QScout assessment sampleHNDL methodology (PDF)
QStrike engagement evidence bundle

Representative QStrike Engagement

Illustrative scope — six service classes, forty-two public endpoints

Period: Q1 illustrative cycle|ID: QS-SAMPLE-ENGAGEMENT

HNDL methodology

Sample structure. Synthetic QStrike engagement output showing the artifact structure. Service names, endpoints, hash fragments, and finding identifiers are synthesized. Scoped reports add organization-specific evidence only under approved engagement controls and an independent validator signature.

Executive summary

This representative engagement surfaced fifty-two cryptographic-debt findings across forty-two endpoints, with twelve rated critical under Mosca-theorem framing.

  • Twelve findings are exploitable under a harvest-now-decrypt-later threat model today; none require future cryptanalytic progress to matter.
  • Classical RSA and finite-field Diffie–Hellman still dominate TLS handshakes at the enterprise edge — representative of industry baseline.
  • Every code-signing and release-integrity primitive in scope was classical; none offered a post-quantum alternative path at the time of scan.
  • Forty-seven of fifty-two findings map to a defined ML-KEM or ML-DSA remediation under FIPS 203 / 204.
HNDL exposure window
12+ year lookback

Recorded traffic encrypted to the weakest in-scope primitive can be decrypted retroactively once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is available.

Signature brittleness
100% classical

All observed code-signing and release-integrity signatures use classical primitives with no hybrid or PQ fallback configured.

Remediation coverage
47 / 52 mapped

Forty-seven of fifty-two findings have a primary migration path defined under NIST post-quantum standards; five require architectural change.

Finding density by service class

Counts reflect the representative engagement. Bars are stacked by severity; widths scale to the densest class in scope.

Edge TLS termination
15
Internal service mesh
13
Release signing pipeline
6
Identity and SSO
7
Secrets management
5
Observability and logs
6
Critical12
High18
Medium15
Low7
Total findings in scope: 52

Representative findings

  1. CriticalQS-F-0001Effort: medium

    edge-gateway-prod

    https://edge-gateway-prod.example-corp.internal:443

    Primitive
    RSA-2048 / SHA-256
    Issue
    RSA-2048 static key in TLS 1.2 handshake — classical, pre-quantum, no hybrid fallback configured.
    HNDL exposure
    Recorded traffic harvestable from current period backward; exposure window grows with time-to-migrate.
    Path to exploit today
    Public edge; ciphertext observable from any ASN on the path. Recorded sessions are retroactively decryptable under the Mosca threat model.
    Recommended remediation
    Terminate with an ML-KEM-768 hybrid key agreement under the draft TLS 1.3 hybrid profile (X25519Kyber768 or equivalent). Retain classical for fallback only until client base migrates.
    Signed artifact fragmenta50e…f7d3ML-DSA-65
  2. CriticalQS-F-0002Effort: medium

    release-signer

    artifact registry, release-signer-prod

    Primitive
    RSA-3072 / SHA-384
    Issue
    Release artifacts signed with RSA-3072 only; no ML-DSA-65 or SLH-DSA signature attached.
    HNDL exposure
    Signature forgery is a future risk tied to CRQC availability; brittleness is present today because no hybrid path is configured.
    Path to exploit today
    All downstream consumers trust a single classical signature. A future forgery would be indistinguishable from a legitimate release.
    Recommended remediation
    Dual-sign every artifact with ML-DSA-65 under FIPS 204 in addition to the classical signature. Publish the attestation hash alongside the signed artifact.
    Signed artifact fragment13b1…7a90ML-DSA-65
  3. HighQS-F-0003Effort: medium

    sso-oidc

    sso-oidc.example-corp.internal:443 — JWKS endpoint

    Primitive
    RSA-2048 / SHA-256 (JWS RS256)
    Issue
    OIDC tokens signed with RS256 (RSA-2048) only. Token rotation cadence is measured in months, not days.
    HNDL exposure
    Tokens recorded today can be analyzed offline; forgery becomes a risk once classical signatures are broken.
    Path to exploit today
    Every federated SaaS consumer relies on this signer. A single forged token grants broad access under current policy.
    Recommended remediation
    Introduce an ML-DSA-65 JWS algorithm alongside RS256. Rotate signing keys on a weekly cadence. Pin validators to an allowlist that includes the PQ alg.
    Signed artifact fragment9ce2…b441ML-DSA-65
  4. HighQS-F-0004Effort: high

    internal-kv-store

    kv-store-prod.example-corp.internal:6443

    Primitive
    AES-128-GCM + RSA-OAEP-2048 wrap
    Issue
    Secrets-at-rest encrypted under AES-128-GCM with key derivation from an RSA-OAEP wrapping key.
    HNDL exposure
    The wrapping key is the choke point. Retroactive unwrap risk applies once the RSA-OAEP primitive is defeated.
    Path to exploit today
    Exfiltrated vault contents are decryptable whenever the wrapping primitive is broken, regardless of symmetric strength.
    Recommended remediation
    Re-wrap data-encryption keys under an ML-KEM-1024 KEM. Rotate DEKs on a documented cadence; retire RSA-OAEP wrap paths after soak.
    Signed artifact fragment4a7f…22dcML-DSA-65
  5. HighQS-F-0005Effort: medium

    service-mesh-mtls

    mesh workload-to-workload mTLS

    Primitive
    ECDHE P-256 / AES-256-GCM
    Issue
    Mesh mTLS uses ECDHE P-256 key exchange. Strong classical, no PQ or hybrid variant negotiated.
    HNDL exposure
    Workload-to-workload traffic is recordable in any colocated capture position. Exposure window is long.
    Path to exploit today
    East-west traffic is at parity with public edge under the HNDL threat model. Breach blast radius is the mesh surface.
    Recommended remediation
    Move mesh key agreement to X25519Kyber768 hybrid. Pin workload certificates to a shorter rotation cadence. Dual-sign mesh certificates.
    Signed artifact fragment6b11…09f2ML-DSA-65
  6. MediumQS-F-0006Effort: low

    log-aggregator

    log-agg-prod.example-corp.internal:9200

    Primitive
    TLS 1.2 (legacy cipher order)
    Issue
    Log transport uses TLS 1.2 with legacy cipher order; weak MAC algorithms still present in the offered suite list.
    HNDL exposure
    Logs in flight contain credentials and session tokens; retroactive decryption yields both.
    Path to exploit today
    Internal-only but broadcast to every ingest collector. A compromised collector unlocks historical log replay.
    Recommended remediation
    Enforce TLS 1.3 only. Remove weak-MAC suites from the offered list. Add an ML-KEM-768 hybrid group once the log agent supports it.
    Signed artifact fragment8d44…ce77ML-DSA-65
  7. MediumQS-F-0007Effort: low

    ingress-legacy

    ingress-legacy.example-corp.internal:443

    Primitive
    DHE-2048 / TLS 1.1
    Issue
    One legacy ingress host still accepts TLS 1.1 for a small partner set; exchange uses DHE with a 2048-bit group.
    HNDL exposure
    Protocol downgrade paths are reachable today; HNDL exposure is elevated relative to peers.
    Path to exploit today
    Partner-facing endpoint. Any observer on the path can capture handshakes and retain them for future decryption.
    Recommended remediation
    Deprecate TLS 1.1 behind a short sunset notice. Move partner integrations to a TLS 1.3 hybrid-enabled endpoint.
    Signed artifact fragment2f0b…41a8ML-DSA-65
  8. LowQS-F-0008Effort: low

    cbom-gap

    build pipeline — CycloneDX 1.7 emission

    Primitive
    CycloneDX 1.7 (partial)
    Issue
    CBOM is emitted but does not include primitive-level detail for three internal service classes; coverage gaps are unreported.
    HNDL exposure
    Not directly HNDL-exposed; gap reduces the ability to attest to coverage during procurement.
    Path to exploit today
    Procurement and audit teams cannot validate PQ readiness claims without primitive-level CBOM.
    Recommended remediation
    Extend CBOM emission to cover all three service classes. Publish the CycloneDX artifact under the Talon signature alongside the release manifest.
    Signed artifact fragment1e87…aa3eML-DSA-65

Migration playbook preview

Abbreviated phase outline. Full playbook delivered with the customer engagement includes per-phase runbooks, rollback gates, and signed attestation hooks.

  1. Step 1Weeks 1 to 4

    Phase 1 — Crypto inventory and CBOM baseline

    CycloneDX 1.7 CBOM covering every in-scope service class; primitive-level detail; signed attestation.

    Owner: Platform security with Qtonic Quantum engagement lead

  2. Step 2Weeks 3 to 10

    Phase 2 — Edge TLS hybrid pilot

    X25519Kyber768 hybrid terminated on one representative edge pool; telemetry records the planned no-impact change window.

    Owner: Edge platform and Qtonic Quantum field engineer

  3. Step 3Weeks 6 to 12

    Phase 3 — Release-signer dual-sign

    Release-signer dual-sign path validated for selected artifacts; downstream validator update plan and rollback rehearsal documented.

    Owner: Release engineering with Qtonic Quantum cryptographer

  4. Step 4Weeks 10 to 16

    Phase 4 — SSO JWS algorithm expansion

    Identity provider issues ML-DSA-65 JWS alongside RS256; validators accept both; cadence shortened to weekly.

    Owner: Identity team with Qtonic Quantum engagement lead

  5. Step 5Weeks 12 to 24

    Phase 5 — Wrapping-key migration

    Data encryption keys re-wrapped under ML-KEM-1024; RSA-OAEP paths retired after documented soak.

    Owner: Platform security and storage engineering

  6. Step 6Ongoing

    Phase 6 — Continuous CBOM and governance

    QScout continuous discovery plus QStrike spot engagements on release-signing and identity surfaces; governance cadence locked.

    Owner: Qtonic Quantum governance partner

Signed bundle

Talon cryptographic attestation

Algorithm
ML-DSA-65 (illustrative FIPS 204-aligned sample)
Bundle
7f2c...e81a(4.2 MB signed bundle)
Signed by
Independent validator signature (sample)
Counter-validation
Qtonic Quantum independent validator

Qualifying QStrike engagements ship a machine-readable evidence bundle with technical signatures and timestamps where the live capability manifest reports them. Downstream consumers should verify hashes against the published attestation path before remediation.

In-browser demonstration · single finding

Evidence path without a PDF

Enterprise buyers should not have to open a PDF on first visit. This panel walks one representative finding through method, boundary, and verdict — the scan is the demonstration.

critical
Finding
QS-F-0001
edge-gateway-prod
https://edge-gateway-prod.example-corp.internal:443
Primitive
RSA-2048 / SHA-256
Bundle context
Representative QStrike Engagement · ML-DSA-65 (illustrative FIPS 204-aligned sample)

  1. 01 · Evidence

    RSA-2048 static key in TLS 1.2 handshake — classical, pre-quantum, no hybrid fallback configured.

  2. 02 · Method

    Non-destructive observation under approved scope. Exposure model: Public edge; ciphertext observable from any ASN on the path. Recorded sessions are retroactively decryptable under the Mosca threat model.

  3. 03 · Boundary

    Illustrative scope only — Illustrative scope — six service classes, forty-two public endpoints. No live customer systems. HNDL window: Recorded traffic harvestable from current period backward; exposure window grows with time-to-migrate.

  4. 04 · Verdict / next action

    Terminate with an ML-KEM-768 hybrid key agreement under the draft TLS 1.3 hybrid profile (X25519Kyber768 or equivalent). Retain classical for fallback only until client base migrates.

Honesty label: synthetic identifiers and signature fragments (a50e…f7d3). Migration effort class: medium. Not a customer attestation.

Want the real bundle?

A QStrike engagement delivers the structure above filled with your organization’s specific data, bound to a Talon-signed bundle for procurement and audit. Engagements run under NDA with an independent validator on the counter-signature.

Start an engagementTalk to the leadership team