Mission-profile research edition · 9 September 2026
Quantum Cybersecurity for the U.S. Military
Mission assurance in a post-quantum world. A 108-page executive field guide for program offices, acquisition teams and mission owners.
The decisive question is not when quantum arrives. It is which mission failures become unacceptable before migration is complete.
- 2030
- Support quantum-resistant cryptography or phase out affected systems
- 2031
- Use quantum-resistant algorithms, unless otherwise noted
- Authority and scope
- Department of War strategy targets. Pages 27 to 35.
Evidence included
Measured studies, not a physics story
Public-key cryptography is embedded in identity, command and control, data links, software signing, coalition access, cloud services, tactical radios, space systems, weapons, logistics, operational technology and the Defense Industrial Base. Replacement must occur across complete trust paths, not only inside a data centre or a single application.
4
Measured studies, plus a transport bandwidth model
1
Supplier-neutral acceptance sheet
pp. 101–108
Methods and file hashes
The September revision adds fresh ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 measurements, six TLS configurations and a transport-budget model. Earlier evidence is unchanged.
Executive command brief
The entire report in one page
The immediate decision is which mission dependencies must change, who owns them, and what evidence will establish readiness.
- 01
Name the mission
Choose long-lived data, a critical trust function and the accountable owner.
- 02
Map the complete path
Include roots, signers, identities, software, suppliers, gateways and fallback.
- 03
Buy measurable evidence
Require exact profiles, versions, validation status, mission tests and acceptance.
- 04
Start a bounded engagement
Use QScout evidence, scoped QStrike and QHunt work, and a QSolve decision roadmap.
Evidence before assertion
What this edition establishes
Research cutoff 9 September 2026. Facts, estimates, analysis and company statements have different evidentiary weight, and the edition labels which is which.
01 · External requirement
Official documents control scope, dates and profiles. Drafts, guidance and proposed rules are identified as such.
02 · Current research
Resource estimates, experiments and vendor reports are distinguished. None is represented as a demonstrated break of military encryption.
03 · Company-provided fact
Qtonic Quantum statements identify the service and delivery boundary. A company statement is not independent validation.
04 · Engagement evidence
Methods, access, acceptance and deliverables follow the agreed scope. Illustrations are not customer results.
05 · No endorsement
Roles are private-sector responsibilities. No government, service, conference or depicted-person product endorsement is implied.
06 · Company-reported state
This edition records that company statement. It does not treat an engineering specification alone as proof of a particular release or deployment.
Independent vendor publication. No government, military-service, AFCEA or conference endorsement is implied.
Connect discovery to a mission decision
QScout finds and prioritises cryptographic evidence. QStrike validates selected hypotheses. QSolve sequences migration with owners and acceptance criteria. QHunt extends the work into authorised mission and operational-technology environments.