No. RSA-1024 is not quantum safe and is below current accepted RSA key-size policy for protected key establishment and signature generation. Locate and replace active uses as a high-priority classical control issue.
Key Takeaway: RSA-1024 is NOT quantum safe. Locate active RSA-1024 uses, revoke or rotate affected credentials where required, and migrate through an approved classical or post-quantum application profile without stopping at another quantum-vulnerable design.
RSA-1024 is not quantum safe and is below current accepted RSA key-size policy for protected uses.
RSA-1024 uses the same RSA algorithm as RSA-2048 and RSA-4096 but with a 1024-bit modulus. This was the standard RSA key size in the 1990s and early 2000s, widely deployed in SSL/TLS certificates, email encryption (PGP, S/MIME), and VPN authentication. The smaller key size made RSA-1024 attractive when computational resources were limited — key generation and encryption operations are significantly faster than RSA-2048.
RSA-1024 is no longer an acceptable security choice under current NIST transition guidance for protected key establishment or signature generation. That policy conclusion does not require claiming that a correctly generated RSA-1024 modulus has been publicly factored.
RSA-1024 has inadequate classical security margin for current protected uses and is also vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. Attack cost depends on modulus quality, implementation, adversary resources, and the attack model; this page does not claim a demonstrated factorization of a correctly generated RSA-1024 key.
A sufficiently capable fault-tolerant quantum computer could attack RSA-1024 with Shor's algorithm. Published resource estimates vary, and no verified evidence supports assigning a 2025-2030 break window.
The replacement priority is already established by classical security policy: locate the exact use, revoke or rotate affected credentials where required, and migrate through a supported profile. Severity still depends on whether the key is active, exposed, trusted, and used for confidentiality or signatures.
RSA-1024 requires high-priority replacement under current classical transition guidance:
Industrial control systems and critical infrastructure face significant RSA-1024 exposure because embedded controllers and SCADA systems deployed in the 2000s-2010s often use RSA-1024 for authentication. Power grids, water treatment facilities, and manufacturing plants may have equipment with 20-30 year operational lifetimes, creating long-tail RSA-1024 exposure. ICS-CERT advisories have warned about this for years.
Legacy financial systems including ATMs, point-of-sale terminals, and payment HSMs deployed before 2013 may still use RSA-1024. PCI-DSS banned RSA-1024 in 2013, but compliance audits occasionally find legacy deployments in production. A successful RSA-1024 break could enable transaction forgery, PIN extraction, and payment fraud.
Government and military systems with long upgrade cycles may retain RSA-1024 in classified networks, secure communications equipment, and cryptographic modules. The NSA deprecated RSA-1024 over a decade ago, but interoperability requirements with allied nations or legacy compatibility may have preserved some usage.
Embedded devices and IoT equipment (routers, network cameras, smart building systems) manufactured before 2015 frequently embed RSA-1024 keys in firmware. These devices often lack secure update mechanisms, creating permanent vulnerabilities.
Treat active RSA-1024 use as a high-priority finding, then determine exposure, trust impact, compensating controls, and the supported replacement path before assigning incident severity.
| Full Name | RSA with 1024-bit keys |
| Category | encryption |
| Key Size | 1024 bits |
| Quantum Vulnerability | Vulnerable to both classical factoring advances and Shor's algorithm. Already deprecated by NIST. |
| NIST Status | RSA moduli below 2048 bits are disallowed for relevant key-establishment and signature-generation uses under NIST transition guidance. |
| Deprecation Timeline | Already disallowed (since 2013) |
| Replaced By | ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key exchange, ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for signatures |
Algorithm-level classification. Standards status and known cryptanalysis are separated from implementation, module-validation, protocol-composition, key-management, and policy evidence.
Evidence-scope review: 2026-07-10
Locate active RSA-1024 uses, revoke or rotate affected credentials where required, and migrate through an approved classical or post-quantum application profile without stopping at another quantum-vulnerable design.
QScout discovers instances of RSA-1024 across your infrastructure within the approved engagement window — designed to minimize operational disruption. First-findings timing is set during operator scoping.